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It is often supposed that we should not impose ‘our’ constructions, understandings 
and values on ‘other’ cultures. Sometimes, this is because it is thought that to do so is 
analogous, or even causally related, to tyrannical imperial and colonial politics, and 
therefore morally bad in the same way that they are morally bad. I shall approach this 
claim via a further, and in some ways stronger claim, that there is something 
epistemically as well as morally problematic about transcultural understanding. 
Specifically, that it is impossible for (meaningful) moral criticism, which requires 
understanding, to reach outside ‘our’ culture.
The wider context of this idea is the question of global justice: What is the 
practical, moral and epistemic significance of boundaries between cultures, societies, 
nations or states?2 My target here is one of several positions which claim that the 
scope of justice is, or should be, restricted by one of these kinds of boundary. Realists 
such as Kenneth Waltz, for instance, have argued that the only duty of a state in the 
international system is to pursue its own strategic interests, and therefore that state 
boundaries are the limit of international morality3. Nationalists such as David Miller, 
for another instance, argue that the demands of (at least) distributive justice apply 
only within the nation understood as a distinctive, valuable, and necessarily size-
limited form of human association4. The position I criticise here, particularism, also 
claims that the scope of justice is limited, in this case by a shared culture which makes 
moral understanding and criticism possible. It is importantly distinct from realism and 
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nationalism, however, in that it grounds that claim on epistemic rather than on 
normative or practical arguments. For the particularist, moral knowledge, the 
normativity of morality, and the possibility of moral criticism, all derive from the 
shared meanings generated by culture. So, criticism cannot reach across boundaries 
between cultures, because there is no substrate of shared meaning by which 
intercultural criticism could be sustained. My analysis and criticism of this position 
focusses especially on work by Michael Walzer, as perhaps the most prominent 
modern particularist.
In Spheres of Justice5, Walzer offers an account of the nature and scope of 
justice which is quite distinct from familiar egalitarian, desert-based and rights-based 
theories. His account is pluralist in three linked senses. First, justice is not universal 
either in space or in time, but is a local and temporary creation of particular political 
communities. Second, there are multiple kinds of good, each with its own criteria of 
just distribution deriving from how a particular community understands that good. At 
least for modern liberal societies, the goods are security and welfare, money and 
commodities, office, hard work, free time, education, kinship and love, divine grace, 
recognition, and political power. Third, there is no underlying, unifying or 
fundamental principle which either determines justice for all communities, or entails a 
just distribution of all goods. Justice is grounded differently for different 
communities. That is, the Walzer of Spheres of Justice is an anti-universalist about 
justice, an anti-monist about the good, and an anti-foundationalist about justification. 
Walzer calls the theory of justice which he derives from these basic commitments 
complex equality: it is satisfied, and a community is therefore just, when each good is 
distributed according to its own, distinctive criteria in its own sphere, and when 
advantage in any one sphere does not translate into advantage in any another. So, for 
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instance, justice is achieved in the sphere of money, in ‘our’ liberal democratic 
community, when it is distributed according to skill and luck in the market, and when 
wealth cannot buy political power.
On the basis of this theory of justice, Walzer argues that only internal criticism 
is possible, and that since our only moral resources are in our shared ‘social 
meanings’6, the shared meanings and ways of life of others are neither available to us  
for comparison nor vulnerable to criticism from us. For Walzer, there is no 
transcultural point of view from which we could judge all, or even our own 
institutions: there cannot be a view from no culture7. All one can do is ‘interpret to 
one’s fellow citizens the world of meanings that we share’8. So, all criticism of ways 
of life is internal criticism, which shows us that we are not living up to our own best 
understanding of justice. Social criticism must be connected criticism – a matter of 
expressing our own standards and highlighting our hypocrisy and failure to live up to 
them, not a matter of deriving prescriptions from universal axioms9. Comparison with 
some other social form is irrelevant to that task, and delusive in its pretence that we 
could stand back from our own and compare it with another’s understanding. ‘A 
given society is just if its substantive life is lived in a certain way – that is, in a way 
faithful to the shared understandings of [its] members’10; it is unjust if not. It cannot 
be praised or condemned according to how it compares to values or understandings
external to it. A caste society cannot be criticised for not living up to egalitarian ideals 
(nor vice versa). The moral and political understandings of other societies are not 
available to us: our political imaginations must be expanded, if at all, by the discovery 
and imaginative interpretation of our own best selves. The politics which Walzer 
uncovers and interprets for us is radically egalitarian and democratic, but his 
methodology is ‘radically particularist’, and so ‘If such a society isn’t already here –
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7 The allusion here is, of course, to Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere (Oxford: 
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8 Ibid., p. xiv.
9 In The Company of Critics: Social criticism and political commitment in the 
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hidden, as it were, in our concepts and categories – we will never know it concretely 
or realize it in fact.’11
Walzer’s argument has been criticised on the grounds that the social meanings 
of at least some goods do not uniquely determine criteria for their distribution. Brian 
Barry12, for instance, argues that the meaning of money for us is just that it is an 
anonymous claim on other goods and services, and that meaning entails no particular 
criteria for just distribution. Ronald Dworkin13 further argues that in our tradition, not 
only do the social meanings of goods not uniquely determine justice in their 
distribution, but Walzer’s appeal to social meaning is self-effacing. Our tradition is 
that the just distribution of goods, for instance medical care, is a matter of continuing 
argument rather than consensus; and that argument is explicitly foundationalist. 
Equality, need, desert or rights, rather than the meaning of goods, determine justice. 
So, if Walzer really wants to rely on shared meanings, he should accept that shared 
meanings are the wrong place to look for a theory of justice.
This paper adopts a different critical strategy. I shall assume, for the sake of 
argument, that justice does arise from the shared social meanings of goods, and that 
those goods have a sufficiently determinate shared meaning to give concrete 
distributive prescriptions; and then show that, even given these assumptions, Walzer’s 
particularism does not follow. Even if justice is a creation of culture, it is not therefore 
particular or bounded: that the grounds of justice are to be found in culture does not 
entail that the scope of justice is limited. I shall make a kind of negative 
transcendental argument for this conclusion: the conditions of possibility of Walzer’s 
shared meanings do not respect his community boundaries; so, if there are shared 
meanings at all, Walzer’s particularism is refuted.
Walzer’s argument requires that there are such things as ‘shared meanings’ 
which can be interpreted for critical and political purposes. The possibility of shared 
meanings depends on the fact of human society: a permanently isolated human could 
not share meaning. Walzer’s argument further depends on a particular understanding 
of the sharing of meaning, and therefore of society. For Walzer, we share some set of 
meanings (democratic, pluralist, complex-egalitarian), and they share some different 
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set, such that our goods are different and incommensurable. There must be at least 
two distinct human societies, and therefore at least two distinguishable sets of 
meanings, if there are to be examples of human sociability which are not available to 
us for comparison and example. It seems obvious, of course, that this is the case: I 
shall argue that it is not. Although individual humans are certainly different from one 
another, and certainly encounter mutual difficulties in understanding, there are no 
discrete, mutually exclusive societies to make discrete, incommensurable meanings 
possible. Walzer’s argument fails, because its foundation is a faulty theory of society. 
I shall now set out and argue for the alternative theory which refutes Walzer’s.
A theory of society14
A theory of society could be an attempt at a complete general account, or even a 
complete explanation of society, but I do not intend anything so ambitious here. As I 
discuss further under ‘Culture and shared meaning’, Walzer’s particularism is best 
understood as part of the interpretative turn in the human sciences, which (putting the 
point crudely) tried to make meaning rather than causal explanation central to 
anthropology, political science, psychology, historiography and philosophy. Part of 
what the partisans of this shift wanted to do was to turn away from what they 
regarded as scientism, reductionism and positivism in favour of interpretation of 
meaning, situated investigation, and participation in ongoing practices and 
narratives15.
In line with my strategy of assuming most of Walzer’s theory for the sake of 
argument, I do not intend to reject this style of working, nor therefore to take on a 
reductive project. I do not claim that the features of human sociability on which I 
focus are real, fundamental or deep in comparison to other features, nor that they are 
finally explanatory. In particular, I claim only that society makes shared meaning 
possible, not that shared meaning is an epiphenomenon of society. Shared meanings 
may well have independent causal powers (I do not need to consider whether or not 
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they do, here). My argument is that the possibility of shared human meaning depends 
on human society: the possibility of shared meaning has society as a necessary, but 
perhaps not a sufficient, condition. The truth of a theory of society which makes 
Walzer’s appeal to incommensurable meanings impossible therefore refutes his 
theory. To repeat, the strategy can be understood as a kind of negative transcendental 
argument: the conditions of possibility of shared meaning have anti-particularist 
consequences. Now that I have described what kind of theory is presented here, we 
can proceed to the theory itself.
Humans, pursuing a wide variety of interests, create, discover, modify and 
destroy social organisations. These organisations consist of networks of humans 
interacting in modes including cooperation, negotiation, production, exchange, 
coercion, hierarchy, friendship, enmity, violence, ritual and play. Interactions are 
carried out both face-to-face and through various media. Almost all humans are 
involved in many such networks, in many roles, and these networks overlap, 
interpenetrate and sometimes include one another. Networks change in response to 
changes in or discoveries of interests, to the effects of other networks, and to 
changing environments and the opportunities and demands they create.
Although it is perhaps possible that some humans could organise themselves 
into a single, unified and discrete organisation in and through which they carried out 
all of their social activity, this has never in fact happened. There are, and have been, 
no social totalities: ‘We can never find a single bounded society in geographical or 
social space.’16 ‘Society’ names not a kind of organism, but an activity, apparently 
natural for humans as for many other animals. It importantly involves the cooperative 
creation and assignment of capacities (especially capacities to attain and distribute 
goods, organise cooperation, manage conflict, dominate others and resist domination). 
Human social life consists of ‘overlapping networks of social interaction’ which are 
also ‘organisations, institutional means of attaining human goals’17.
Human social life has historically been both various, and sometimes quite 
stable, and I therefore use ‘social form’ as a term of convenience for any relatively 
stable and persistent bundle of networks, where it is useful to have a shorthand for 
such a distinguishable way of life. However, I do not intend to imply that any such 
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social form is a fully discrete society, nor that it is a higher-order entity than the 
individuals and networks of which it consists.
Human society depends on general human capacities18. Humans share a 
number of such capacities, including capacities to learn and use language; to create, 
understand and use symbols; to act on reasons and explain (or conceal) those reasons; 
to have and act on a variety of emotional and dispositional states apart from reasons; 
to make and use tools; to create and challenge hierarchies; to act in, and by using, 
social networks; to make decisions; to be selfish or altruistic; to be violent or friendly; 
to perceive oneself as a self in the context of other selves; and to create, internalise, 
perform and find significance in rituals. Many of these capacities are shared in some 
form or degree by our close relatives, including Chimpanzees, Gorillas, Orang-Utans 
and other primates. For the same reason that we are a particular kind of evolved 
creature, humans also share some general interests19. They include interests in food, 
shelter, company, continued life, the respect of peers and the absence of (threatened 
or actual) violence. These interests can be trumped by other, often socially 
constructed demands, but are typical of humans and very strong. So, an appeal to such 
interests, to a stranger, can often be effective. Individual humans’ interests can clash 
at least because they sometimes differ, and because although you and I both have 
interests in food, for instance, our interests clash in conditions of scarcity.20
If this theory that human society consists in overlapping and interpenetrating 
networks, not discrete and mutually exclusive societies, is true, then Walzer’s theory 
(and the similar theories and beliefs of which his are an exemplar) cannot get off the 
ground. Although we do share meaning, the possibility of doing so is dependent on 
society, and society is not such that it could make one set of meanings for us, and 
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another incommensurable set for them. However, we still need to show that this 
network theory is true. I shall argue for it by contrasting it with a familiar, alternative 
way of characterising human society, on which Walzer’s theory would work.
Against social totalities
To the extent that it is not simply a careless way of talking or a traditional working 
assumption, the assertion of the existence of social totalities is the claim that humans 
are typically found in discrete, unified social ‘boxes’, which have boundaries, 
subsystems, levels or dimensions, and perhaps an internal ‘evolutionary’ dynamic, 
and within which the society’s members share meaning which is inaccessible to those 
outside. On this view, social change and conflict can be divided into endogenous and 
exogenous types, human behaviour can be explained by reference to ‘social structure 
as a whole’21, and there are two distinct, but analogous, problems for political 
philosophy: one about how individuals within a society should organise themselves, 
and another, at a ‘second level’, about how distinct societies should organise their 
interrelations. These problems have been thought sufficiently analogous by Kant and 
by Rawls, for instance, that they have attempted to answer both with the device of a 
hypothetical contract22.
It is unclear to me what these claims could be except empirical ones about 
how humans now, or always, live23. But they are false. As Michael Mann argues:
Empirical proof can be seen in the answer to a simple question: In which society 
do you live? Answers are likely to start at two levels. One refers to national states: 
My society is “the United Kingdom,” “the United States,” “France,” or the like. 
The other is broader: I am a citizen of “industrial society” or “capitalist society” or 
possibly “the West” or “the Western alliance.” We have a basic dilemma – a 
national state society versus a wider “economic society.” For some important 
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Writings, trans. H. B. Nisbet (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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purposes, the national state represents a real interaction network with a degree of 
cleavage at its boundaries. For other important purposes, capitalism unites all three 
into a wider interaction network, with cleavage at its edge. They are both 
“societies.” Complexities proliferate the more we probe. Military alliances, 
churches, common language, and so forth, all add powerful, sociospatially 
different networks of interaction. We could only answer after developing a 
sophisticated understanding of the complex interconnections and powers of these 
various crosscutting interaction networks. The answer would certainly imply a 
confederal rather than a unitary society.24
The argument so far is that we in particular do not live in unitary and discrete 
societies, despite the enormous power and reach of modern states which try to divide 
us up into such boxes. This is shown, especially, by the overlapping coexistence of 
two different kinds of social network, national states and capitalism, and emphasised 
by the range of other, sociospatially different networks in which we are also involved. 
Mann continues by arguing that this confederal situation is typical of human life, not 
just of our life. Empires, trade-and-cultural networks, world religions, all cut across 
one another: ‘Overlapping interaction networks are the historical norm … The forms 
of overlap and intersection have varied considerably, but they have always been 
there.’25 It is not only we who live in a confederal situation: most humans have 
always lived like that. The belief in social totalities badly misrepresents the current 
and historical experience of social humans, and should therefore be abandoned. In its 
place, we need to recognise the typical human situation of being involved in multiple, 
cross-cutting networks of interaction, with particular and different spatial and social 
reaches, tactics and dynamics. Humans ‘are social, but not societal, animals’26.
General names for social totalities like ‘culture’, ‘nation’ or ‘tribe’, and 
particular ones like ‘Iroquois, Greece, Persia, or the United States’27 distort our 
perception of human social organisation. They need not therefore be abandoned (they 
are occasionally useful), but they obscure complex and cross-cutting inter-relations, 
and must not be hypostasised.
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26 Ibid., p. 14.
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Society against societies
I have mapped human society as a notably flat landscape, without impermeable 
boundaries. Humans, pursuing various ends and interests, create, discover, modify 
and destroy social organisations, which are networks of humans interacting in various 
ways, and creating and assigning capacities. These networks overlap and 
interpenetrate one another. Networks change in response to changes in, or discoveries 
of, interests; to the effects of other networks; and to changing environments and the 
opportunities and demands they create. Humans do not organise themselves into 
unitary and discrete social totalities, but live in confederal social situations.
This refutes Walzer’s claim that our only moral and critical resources are to be 
found in our discrete shared meanings, by showing that it relies on a faulty theory of 
society. Since there are no discrete societies, but only cross-cutting networks, there 
can be no such conflicts of incommensurable meaning between home and abroad, 
between us and them. The social meanings and forms of others are available to us for 
warning, emulation, criticism and utopian construction. I have not argued that humans 
never face each other across divides in understanding: that would be merely silly. I 
have argued that the divides do not separate us into discrete bodies of people who 
share meanings internally, but have no access or understanding externally. Each of us 
has many networks in which we share meaning, and many boundaries at which we 
currently do not. I say currently, because humans clearly do have capacities to cross 
such boundaries: we have the capacity to create shared meaning with strangers. If we 
did not, it is difficult to see how the shared meanings to which Walzer appeals could 
have come about, since all of us frequently meet and deal with strangers, beginning 
with our parents. That is: the capacity which makes Walzer’s shared meanings 
possible also makes his mutually incomprehensible bodies of meaning-sharers 
impossible. Humans can only share meaning because we can reach across divides in 
understanding, and if there could be permanent strangers, there could not be 
communities of meaning-sharers. There is no permanent ‘we’ and incomprehensible 
‘they’.
To recap: I have argued that the possibility of shared meaning depends on 
society; that society is not such as could support the existence of incommensurable 
meanings; and further, that the very social capacity which creates shared meanings 
makes permanently separate societies of us and them impossible.
Culture and shared meaning
It may be suggested that I have missed the point. Walzer is talking about cultures, not 
societies, as his appeal to shared meaning indicates. As I have already suggested, 
Walzer is part of the large post-interpretive turn camp – he is to political philosophy 
what Jerome Bruner is to psychology28 – and his central focus is on the interpretation 
of meaning: ‘One characteristic above all is central to my argument. We are (all of us) 
culture-producing creatures; we make and inhabit meaningful worlds.’29 In making 
this central commitment, Walzer is following the anthropologist (and his late 
colleague in the Institute of Advanced Studies at Princeton) Clifford Geertz in 
believing that ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has 
spun’ and taking ‘culture to be those webs, and the analysis of it to be therefore not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning’30. 
Walzer’s interpretation of shared meanings and consequent critical practice are 
interpretive, and he has taken to heart the idea that there is something especially 
difficult about interpretation abroad, as opposed to at home. This is not a counter-
argument to what I have claimed, unless we are prepared to suppose that culture is 
independent of the social interactions of the people who are its carriers and makers. In 
the absence of such an claim (which would surely be bizarre), the fact that humans do 
not live in discrete, mutually exclusive societies means that their cultures are not 
discrete or mutually exclusive either.
However, the point about culture, and Geertz’s semiotic understanding of it in 
particular, is important. Walzer has adopted Geertz, and his work does appear to 
                                                
28 See for instance Jerome Bruner, Acts of Meaning (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1990).
29 Walzer, Spheres of Justice, p. 314.
30 Geertz, ‘Thick Description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture’ in The 
Interpretation of Cultures (London: Fontana Press, 1993), pp. 3-30. p. 5. Walzer 
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support particularist claims: but, I shall argue, it does not (and, consequently, 
anthropological theory does not support the particularist theories I am using Walzer to 
exemplify).
Geertz is importantly a deflator of the pretensions of scientific anthropology. 
It had been believed that one could (for instance) travel from England to the Sudan, 
describe the social form of the Nuer as a ‘segmentary lineage’, and thereby 
understand the Nuer themselves (this is of course a pastiche, but it will do to make the 
point). The understanding gained would help one to predict Nuer behaviour, to bring 
them under ‘rational’ adminstration as part of an empire, and to place and explain 
them in a wider taxonomy of human social forms and their historical development (as 
‘primitive’, as an acephalous tribe, as operating a certain kind of kinship system). 
Geertz argues that, on the contrary, understanding the Nuer or anyone else is an 
intensely difficult and never complete process of interpretation. Encounters with 
others are attempts at reading: ‘Doing ethnography is like trying to read (in the sense 
of “construct a reading of”) a manuscript – foreign, faded, full of elipses, 
incoherencies, suspicious emendations, and tendentious commentaries.’31 What one 
reads or interprets is always already an interpretation. There is no bedrock of 
uninterpreted data: the ethnographer is always ‘explicating explications’32.
Two things have lent themselves to misinterpretation of this argument. The 
first is that Geertz’s examples are all, unsurprisingly, from ethnographic fieldwork. 
He describes, for instance, a complex ‘confusion of tongues’ between Jewish, Berber 
and French ‘frames of interpretation’ in Morocco, in 1912 (as reported to him in 
1968)33. This may give rise to the thought – in my view, has given rise to it – that 
there is something especially difficult about going abroad and attempting to 
understand them, or in attempting to translate between Jewish, Berber and French 
self-understandings, but that no such difficulty applies when we are at home, or when 
Jews, Berbers or French people talk amongst themselves. The second thing which 
lends itself to misunderstanding is Geertz’s emphasis on the incompleteness of 
interpretation. There is no final reading of culture, only an ongoing process of 
rereading, of attempting to reunderstand what is already understood. This may give 
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32 Ibid., p. 9.
33 Ibid.
rise to the thought that interpretation (when abroad) cannot be done at all, because it 
cannot be finished34.
Neither of these thoughts seems to me to do justice to what Geertz says. 
Geertz is importantly influenced by the later Wittgenstein35, and his method is best 
understood as an application and development of Wittgenstein’s approach to 
language. Culture, like language, is public, and understanding it does not consist in 
discovering its logical form or subsuming it under a concept (‘segmentary lineage’). It 
consists in learning to go on in the right way. So, ‘finding our feet’ in someone’s 
culture is a matter of ‘seeking, in the widened sense of the term in which it 
encompasses very much more than talk, to converse with them, a matter a great deal 
more difficult, and not only with strangers, than is commonly recognised’36. Geertz’s 
point is not that there is something fundamentally problematic about conversing when 
abroad, but that there is something mysterious about conversing at all. Nonetheless, 
we do manage to converse. ‘The famous anthropological absorption with the (to us) 
exotic [is] essentially a device for displacing the dulling sense of familiarity with 
which the mysteriousness of our own ability to relate perceptively to one another is 
concealed from us.’37
So: Geertz’s point is not that, when we venture abroad, we leave behind a 
people and a culture which we understand, and encounter a people and a culture 
which is and must remain wholly opaque to us. It is that our interpretations of one 
another are always tentative and ongoing, wherever we are: ‘Foreignness does not 
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commentaries on Jane Austen which would work through the whole canon, one novel 
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35 See ‘Passage and Accident: A life of learning’ in Available Light, pp. 3-20. For 
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36 Geertz, ‘Thick Description’, p. 13, my emphasis.
37 Ibid., p. 14.
start at the water’s edge but at the skin’s… The wogs begin long before Calais.’38 The 
anthropological exotic (apart from its intrinsic interest) is a way of bringing home to 
ourselves both the difficulty and the surprising possibility of mutual understanding. 
Geertz’s interpretive anthropology, far from supporting the Walzerian claim that 
understanding and critique cannot leave home, emphasises the fact that, necessarily,
we continuously cross our own boundaries, encounter strangers, and half-successfully 
engage with them.
Epistemic colonialism
I have already pastiched one kind of anthropology, which attempts to understand 
others by discovering the logical form of their culture, or by subsuming it under  
abstract concepts. This kind of anthropology certainly was involved in colonial 
projects: E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s pioneering work with the Nuer39, for instance, was 
involved with British colonialism. When Evans-Pritchard lived with and studied them 
in the 1930s, the Nuer were a group of perhaps two or three hundred thousand people 
living around the Nile, in what was then the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, in East Africa. At 
that time, they were having to deal rapidly with invasion by British military forces 
and the consequent imposition of new administrative and political institutions, 
including, for instance, a colonial governor who argued that the Nuer ‘are slow to 
appreciate the blessings of European civilization and the benefits arising from an 
ordered administration of their country. Although this outspoken self-consciousness 
was bound to lead to conflicts, it must be admitted that the personal qualities of the 
people that caused these conflicts are of a kind that ought to be cultivated and guided 
rather than blamed and suppressed.’40 Evans-Pritchard ‘was profoundly aware of “the 
colonial encounter” and was, in fact, part of it’41, having been commissioned by the 
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40 Diedrich Westermann, Introduction to Ray Huffman, Nuer Customs and Folk-Lore
(London: Frank Cass & Co., 1970; first published 1931), pp. v-xi. p. v.
41 Hutchinson, Nuer Dilemmas, p. 30.
colonial government in the Sudan to investigate the Nuer. We should be wary of 
ascribing crudely colonial motives to him personally, but should be aware that at least 
part of the point of his investigations was to render the Nuer transparent to 
bureaucratic surveillance and thereby take them under imperial state control.
So, one sort of attempt to understand others – the Nuer, in this case – is clearly 
related to one sort of colonial project. The two are also analogous, at least in that both 
are one-sided and probably self-interested (they involve the imposition of structures 
of understanding or control by one side on the other, apparently for purposes of 
exploitation). Perhaps the thinking which leads to positions like Walzer’s is this: 
(attempted) understanding of other cultures was part of morally disastrous colonial 
projects; we should never have undertaken such projects (we should have stayed at 
home); critiques of this kind of understanding (such as Geertz’s) are therefore 
critiques of ‘going abroad’ in understanding, and of the consequent attempt to criticise 
and transform local arrangements in terms of the putative ‘blessings of European 
civilization’. However, as I argued above, this misunderstands Geertz’s critique. We 
can certainly reject attempts to impose our own social arrangements on others, 
especially when doing so requires violence and oppression, but we are unwise to do 
so in terms of a rejection of the possibility of understanding strangers sufficiently that 
we could share goods with them. Not all transcultural understanding takes that form; 
if Geertz is right, no genuine understanding of humans could take it, for reasons 
analogous to Wittgenstein’s reasons for denying the possibility of private language 
(although we should note that rendering local, opaque systems of punishment, land 
tenure and measurement transparent to bureaucratic surveillance has historically been 
an effective method of control, and therefore that something is apparently being 
understood in such cases42).
Conclusion: the ethics of engagement with strangers
I began by setting out a view about the possibility of transcultural understanding and 
criticism, using Michael Walzer’s Spheres of Justice as a exemplar. I have shown that 
it depends on an untenable account of the nature of human society, and therefore that 
it ought to be abandoned. I then went on to consider the relations between this view 
and Clifford Geertz’s influential account of the interpretation of culture, and 
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distinguished two putative kinds of understanding, only the first of which seems 
linked or analogous to colonial projects. Where does this leave us in relation to the 
worry I raised at the start of this paper, that there is something immoral about 
understanding others in our own terms? I suggest that it leaves us with the (obvious?) 
thought that it depends very much on what we mean by ‘understanding’. There is a 
sort of (attempted) understanding of others, which is exemplified by the colonial 
practice of investigation for purposes of surveillance and exploitation, and which is, at 
best, morally tainted by its association with oppression. However, there is another sort 
of understanding, exemplified by the interpretive practice urged by Geertz, on which 
the process of coming to converse with strangers is difficult, never finished, and vital. 
This does not seem morally problematic: indeed, it seems to me to be morally 
required. It is certainly pragmatically required, given that meeting strangers is not 
something we can avoid.
This second kind of understanding does not involve (merely) imposing our 
own categories on others who have different understandings of themselves: it involves 
‘finding our feet’ with others. That is, it involves being able to go on in a practice (or 
according to the rules of some game) which has become shared. Peter Winch has 
argued that ‘Seriously to study another way of life is necessarily to seek to extend our 
own – not simply to bring the other way within the already existing boundaries of our 
own.’43 I claim that seriously to attempt to understand another person is to change 
oneself, because the actual world does not consist of discrete societies or cultures 
which meet and clash at their boundaries. It consists (in part) of social and variously 
cultured individual humans who must unendingly interpret one another. This process 
is not (cannot be) one-sided. Mutual criticism, including self-criticism, must 
sometimes be a part of meeting and interpreting strangers, and part of the importance 
of the shock of the different which anthopological data provides is that it is also an 
ethical shock. Our encounters with strangers who need not remain strangers can 
remind us of the basic ethical truth44 that our ways are not inevitable, and could be 
mistaken. That possibility is an important basis for (moral, social, political) criticism, 
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and we would be ill-advised in practice, as well as mistaken in theory, to rule it out of 
court as not part of ‘our’ shared meanings.
The central point I have made against particularism, as exemplified by Walzer, 
is that we can get to a kind of universalism about justice without assuming the 
possibility of a view from nowhere. The facts of human sociability mean that 
understanding can start from where we are, and have no need to stop at community 
boundaries. That is, the conditions of possibility of the shared meanings to which 
Walzer appeals have anti-particularist consequences. The point of later sections has 
been to argue that we are not faced with a choice between, on one hand, staying at 
home and leaving other cultures alone in their incomprehensible (to us) shared 
meanings; and, on the other, becoming imperialists. The third, morally and practically 
vital option is engagement with strangers, and it need not stop at any impermeable 
cultural boundary, because there are no such boundaries.
A final recap: I have argued that, even if we accept a great deal of the
interpretive approach to philosophical, anthropological and other human science 
practice in general, and Walzer’s derivation of justice from the social meaning of 
goods in particular, we can nonetheless resist Walzer’s anti-universalism. Even if 
justice must come from shared meaning, this does not entail that no transcultural 
criticism in the name of justice is possible, because the conditions of possibility of 
shared meaning – the facts of human sociability – make discrete, mutually-
incomprehensible cultures impossible. This leaves us with the difficult problem of 
coming to understand those who are currently strangers to us, rather than the 
congenial certainty of shared understanding at home; but it also defends the vital 
possibility of transcultural criticism.
